CANDOUR

Founded by G.K. Chesterton in 1953

To defend national sovereignty against the menace of international finance

Volume 73. Numbers 3 & 4. July 2003

MUSSOLINI AND THE MAFIA

THE DEATH AND LIFE OF THE MAFIA IN ITALY: FROM SUPPRESSION BY MUSSOLINI TO REVIVAL BY 'LIBERATION,' 1926-1946[1]

by James J. Martin

Cesare Mori, Mussolini's chief of police in the 1920's.

Conservatives and liberals alike yield to florid raving when writing of Benito Mussolini and Italian Fascism. In their books and articles and reviews of one another's books, there is usually cheerful agreement on the horrid sinfulness of 'Il Duce,' and unconcealed gloating at his overthrow (Winston Churchill rushed in to his dinner party upon hearing of Mussolini's murder, exclaiming with gratification, "Ah, the bloody beast is dead!"), with an occasional murmur of unhappiness later on from those who realised how close Italy came to becoming a Stalinist client state by default.

In the last three decades there has been much moaning about the incredibly bad condition of Italy's government since the eclipse of Fascism. But at the same time it is conventional to make contemptuous references to any efforts asserting that Mussolini was responsible for *something* of significance, even though the country is still covered with memorials of his era. Few overcome the shams of modern ideological fuzz-sorting, and most Mussolini detractors end up producing a literature which resembles what might have been fished from the wastebaskets of the old *Daily Worker*.

The bias in favour of Communist explanations is best revealed in the established account in the last generation concerning Mussolini's end. Invariably we read of him being 'executed by partisans,' though all should know better. Bushwhackers prowling behind the battle lines and self-appointed political opponents representing foreign allegiance exploiting the disorder caused by war are not empowered to 'execute' anyone. Mussolini was murdered by Italian Communists operating under Stalinist discipline.[2] It was as simple as that. By the standards the friends of world Communism apply to Italy in 1945, one would have to declare that any time a head of state were killed anywhere, it would have to be described as an 'execution.'

One of the consequences of the destruction of Mussolini and his regime was a prodigious rise in criminal activities in Italy, engineered by traditional organised criminal gangs which returned to the scene of established activities when emptied from the confines of Mussolini's prisons. Dominating this development were the revivified Mafia, effectively subdued for over a decade before the arrival in 1943-44 of the Anglo-American armies, and suddenly back in business everywhere with the achievement of 'liberation.' For a time, wounded ideologues were offended by the assertion that the Mafia had returned to former power and influence as a consequence of 'Allied' policies, and sought to minimise the achievement of Mussolini's police in earlier decades, by suggesting that the Mafia had been little disturbed in those days, thus managing to ignore all the evidence of substance to the contrary which was available in many locations. How they explain the sudden prominence of the 'Honoured Society' immediately upon the scene coincident with the 1943 invasion of Sicily by Mussolini's enemies is substantially an essay in utter awkwardness. The literature which contradicts this line has been growing

steadily, and a steady readjustment has been taking place, despite repeated efforts to divert attention away from the central importance of the Allied invasion of Sicily in July, 1943 in making the Mafia a power once more. If the Mafia came ashore only figuratively in the landing craft and the tanks of the 'liberators,' there surely was much direct communication and supporting action between the latter and the remnants of the Mafia in the path of the invasion in the first two weeks or so of the assault on the island. That this aspect of the story has been gravely exaggerated becomes evident as time passes and more realistic appraisals of that event occur. What remains obscured is the beginning of it all, an embarrassment to most writers on the subject, who prefer to substitute ex post facto value judgements in harmony with a generation of liberal fixations for the facts.

While the authors of modern accounts of the Mafia are not all inclined to gloss over the vicious homicidal greed of the contemporary Brotherhood, a note of plaintive wistfulness creeps into some of their narratives at the point where they deal with the collision between the Mussolini regime and the Mafia in Italy. The arrest and conviction of the latter for hundreds of murders, among thousands of other crimes, becomes a bagatelle and an incidental; the central fact is the jostling of their 'civil rights and liberties.' It is unimportant that this large contingent of the world's most depraved criminals is locked up; a tear or two courses silently down the cheeks of the writers and falls upon their typewriters as they contemplate the injury done to this brutal killer fold's tender psyches by the Mussolini police, and their partial dispersal from Sicily to the underworld of the large American cities is treated almost in the same class as the flight of the Israelite children from the agents of Herod. The police draw not a single word of commendation and are cast as the villain in their effort to clear Sicily and southern Italy of the most deeply entrenched criminal enterprises in Europe. The real forgotten persons in these quasi-apologies for the Mafia are their non-criminal victims; it is almost impossible to read anything about them. Whatever the mawkish sentimentality aroused on behalf of the gangsters, one can generally be assured that their prey will remain nameless, the multitudes from whom they have robbed and extorted vast sums blithely ignored, and the legion they have slain effectively lost from the record in perpetuity.

The campaign of the Mussolini regime to extirpate the Mafia from Sicily began abruptly though there is much doubt as to the motivation for it, and many details still evade the students of this matter. September 25, 1926 is the date assigned for the formal initiation of the anti-Mafia program by the *Encyclopaedia of World History*, which source described the Mafia as "a loose criminal organisation which had dominated Sicilian politics for 50 years."[3] It was significant that the editors should make direct reference to the relationship between crime and politics; any kind of basic understanding of the former without a solid awareness of the realities of the latter, anywhere in the world, is unlikely.

The above date, however, was just the occasion when a bill had been introduced in the Italian Chamber of Deputies for the suppression of the Mafia in Sicily.[4] The drive had actually begun almost five months earlier. On April 30, Mussolini's police had arrested 450 suspected Mafia in raids which were conducted simultaneously in a dozen cities and towns, fighting what were reported in the American newspapers as "pitched battles."[5] A New York *Times* feature article two days later identified the 'boss' of the Mafia at this moment as one Gaetano Ferrarello.[6] But the account was somewhat premature and innocent in announcing that Sicily was rid of these "bandits" "after 50 years of terror." Mussolini was quoted as declaring that "the wound of Sicilian criminality" would be "cauterised" "with iron and fire if necessary," and that his regime would "go to the very root of the matter regardless of anyone's feelings."[7]

There is little to notice for over a year after these dramatic pronouncements on the subject by the leader of Italian Fascism, undoubtedly a period of intensive investigation and preparation by the prosecution. But on October 22, 1927 the first result of the offensive was announced, when a mass trial of *Mafiosi* began following a dragnet which scooped up more than 30 leaders at Termini Imerese.[8] On January 11, 1928 there resulted the conviction of 147 persons, seven of whom received life at hard labour, eight receiving sentences of 30 years, and an additional five getting 25 years.[9] Though later writers conveniently overlooked the reported facts and tried to create the impression that the defendants were the victims of 'drumhead' proceedings which trampled on the defendants' 'civil rights,' these same defendants apparently had the resources to hire a battery of 60 lawyers to head up their defence. Reporters concluded that the organisation had surely received its 'death blow' now.[10]

But the assault on the Mafia had barely begun. On February 8, a new trial of 341 Mafia suspects began in Palermo,[11] followed by the arrest and trial, also in Palermo, of an additional 379 persons from Agrigento and Caltanisetto.[12] In the latter some 500 police were involved, the defendants being charged among other things with 500 major crimes, including 62 murders.

On March 7, 1928 the court at Termini Imerese convicted 67 more persons for various crimes, and sentenced them to terms of from two to 27 years.[13] Special penal farms were created on the Lipari Islands, off the north coast of Sicily, where these sentences were to be served.[14]

From this time on, feature articles on this sensational programme crowded into the press of the world, and none outside Italy exceeded the New York *Times* in breadth of coverage. A column and a half story on January 16, 1928 trumpeted, "Breaking the backbone of the Mafia is one of Premier Mussolini's great achievements."[15] And an editorial the following day pinpointed the actual police executive responsible for directing this drive. Prefect Cesare Mori of Palermo, a veteran of almost 40 years of service in the Italian police. Said the *Times*, Prefect Mori of Palermo, who has broken the back of the Mafia in Sicily, will go down in history as a deliverer and superman."[16]

The *Times* ultimately ran three commendatory profiles of Mori, probably the most admiring being by their own correspondent, Arnaldo Cortesi, on March 4, 1928,[17] which also included a photograph of Mori and a picture of a group of alleged Mafia on trial, enclosed in a large cage; this latter tactic was employed a number of times during mass trials, and was intended to protect the judge, witnesses and jury from personal attack by one or another of the defendants. Cortesi concluded that police working under Prefect Mori had made arrests in 79 of 361 municipalities, totalling 1086 men belonging to five gangs, and accused, among hundreds of serious crimes, of 357 murders alone. Between May, 1926 and the end of March, 1928 it was determined that 11 policemen had been killed and another 350 wounded in what amounted to virtual battles with the Mafia.

Though some narratives concerned with the suppression of the Mafia tend to be exclusively concerned with Sicily and dream up fanciful reasons for this operation,[18] it was actually part of a three-pronged effort to subdue organised crime as well on the island of Sardinia, and in Calabria, the three provinces in the 'toe' of the Italian mainland 'boot'. A *Times* survey on February 19, 1928 reported that Italian authorities considered the Sardinian crime rate to be double that of Sicily, with a murder rate of 24 per 100,000 population, as against Sicily's 16. As for Calabria, it was officially considered to have a crime rate higher than either Sicily or Sardinia, and observers were wondering when Mussolini would stretch the anti-crime drive there.[19]

Some social and political realities of the time during which this anti-Mafia onslaught took place have to be kept in mind, as well as some of the international implications. The swiftness and comprehensiveness of the drive headed by Prefect Mori caused grave disturbances among the Mafia, which responded to it not only in major gun battles with the police but also in flight from the area, ranging from the Italian mainland to the United States. Though the major Sicilian figures in the American branch of the Mafia had arrived well before 1926, their gangs accumulated a considerable number of lesser hoodlums who found America a haven from the Italian police pursuit. The large number of Italians in the U.S.A also made a convenient hiding place for this immigrating criminal element. The adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution had spawned a fantastic increase in the opportunity available to make a living by breaking the law,[20] and the supplying of the parched American appetite for illegal alcohol, and everything that went with it in the field of legally enjoined pleasures and diversions, gave organised crime a stimulus which could hardly have even been imagined at an earlier time, even though criminal gangs were a part of urban America since the early post-Civil War years. With Americans spending $100,000,000 a year abroad on alcohol by 1925,[21] it can be understood that those who decided they should spend such money on hard liquor at home knew what they were doing in developing the massive smuggling system that evolved in the 1923-1933 decade. The Mafia were just a part of the entire 'bootlegging' scene, competing with other ethnic gangs of Irish, Jewish and assorted lesser organisations of different ancestry,[22] let alone the immense domestic group of native birth engaged in home manufacture and distribution of high voltage drink, much of it of somewhat questionable nature.[23]

In any case, the Mussolini effort to stamp out the Mafia contributed to the mobilisation of Sicilian gangsters here. And in a significant way they also brought long-standing feuds and competition with them. The legal authorities reported 527 gangster killings in the state of Illinois alone in 1928, part of this sharp rise traceable to the importation of ancient rivalries from Sicily.[24]

Though the criminals fleeing from the island did not make recourse to the ploy of claiming to be 'political' persecutees, so dear to killers and armed robbery and mayhem artists in the U.S. of 40 years later, they did not shrink from involvement in political affairs if there was gain to be made from it. A number of Mafia 'refugees' were known even to return to Italy early in 1927 to build a system to smuggle 'anti-fascists' to France.[25]

It has been seen that many of the convictions of Mafia in Sicilian courts were for homicide, but that no death sentences were handed down. Italy had no capital punishment for any offence at that time, though this was restored late in November, 1926 following the third assassination attempt on Mussolini in that same year. The regime proposed its re-establishment on November 5, and the Italian Senate approved it fifteen days later.[26] However, it was severely restricted to a very limited number of offences; treason, espionage, armed rebellion, and attempts on the life of the head of state by an Italian *native* (this delicate stipulation was probably made to exclude any possible ex post facto invocation of the law against the first of Mussolini's attempted killers in 1926, an Englishwoman who was the sister of an English nobleman[27]). So no death penalty attached to subsequent Mafia convicted of murder either, and there were quite a few.

A remarkable decrease in crime in Italy and Sicily was reported by early 1929,[28] but Prefect Mori's offensive bore on. As a consequence of an extended proceeding, 154 members of a Palermo gang were sent to prison on February 28.[29] Then another major trial took place at Termini Imerese, which lasted nine months and concluded with a jury mulling over 7,000 questions. Part of the problem here was a consequence of the voluminous documentation supplied by the prosecution, which involved the vast captured correspondence of the Mafia chief in this instance, a lawyer named Ortolena. This material not only demonstrated a serious involvement of Sicilian governmental authorities but also revealed significant ties with Mafia in the United States. It ended in a verdict of guilty for 150 of the 161 defendants, on May 1, 1929.[30]

In 1930 another major trial took place in Sicily at Sciacca, involving 241 alleged Mafia, who were accused of several hundred crimes, including 43 homicides. The prosecution eventually produced a small mountain of documentary evidence, which filled 69 boxes. Beginning in the first week of July,[31] the trial dragged on into 1931. On June 22 of that year, the trial concluded with the conviction of 124 Mafia (the number of the defendants had shrunk from 241 to 178), 15 of the convicted receiving life sentences, and the 109 others receiving a total of 1,200 years in prison. The jury was out 4 days, and considered a total of 3,000 questions.[32] This Sciacca trial was considered the most sensational of the entire series; the defendants sitting in three iron barred cages throughout the proceedings before the Court of Assizes. What was worth noticing once more was that the defendants were hardly poverty-stricken peasants, being represented once more by a substantial contingent of what were reputed to be highly paid lawyers.[33]

There had been a diversion at the start of this trial. Five days after it commenced, Azzo Rosario, the mayor of Lucca, a medium-sized city in northwest Italy, was murdered, and witnesses testified that his murderers were Mafia members.[34] This represented an exceptional case, since it was most uncommon to see the Mafia involved in criminal affairs this far away from their customary base. It was more likely that this homicide was related to internal political affairs, as assassinations of officials of various ranks had been going on repeatedly since the Matteotti affair.

Americans were treated to a eyewitness report on a Mafia trial by an American early in December, 1930. The well-known magazine publisher, S.S. McClure, was present at the beginning of a new Palermo trial. He mentioned that Prefect Mori had received four gold medals for his work in prosecuting the Mafia since 1926, and reported that on one

occasion Palermo had experienced 1,750 murders in a single year. The Mori campaign had thus far resulted in roughly 2,000 arrests and about half as many convictions, with the result, McClure stated, that "Today, in Sicily and Naples, and in all the regions heretofore plagued by the racketeer, there is absolute freedom from any form of extortion."[35]

By the end of 1931 the drive to wipe out the Mafia was entering its final stages. Another big Palermo trial started on November 29 of that year, with the public prosecutor seeking jail sentences for between 165 and 200 of a somewhat larger group of defendants.[36] The trial lasted into Christmas week, and of an eventual 245 persons brought before the court, 141 were convicted on December 29, 1931.[37]

Only one trial drew attention in 1932, but it was another on the scale previously conducted at Sciacca. This one began in the early spring, at Agrigento, and was held in the former monastery of Santo Spirito in that city, with the defendants once more confined in a large barred cage in the improvised courtroom. Here on May 2, 1932 another 244 Mafia members were sentenced to a total of 1,200 years in prison.[38] And a special piece to the New York *Times* six weeks later praised Italy as a country among the world's leaders in instituting penal reforms.[39]

To this point the entire attention had been devoted to the anti-Mafia incursion in Sicily, though a simultaneous drive had been going on in the neighbouring island of Sardinia. On June 22, 1934 an electrifying raid took place on the Italian mainland, largely in the towns of Cadeto, Gallino, Arno and Pellaro, all located on the 'sole' of the Italian peninsular 'boot.' Some 400 Mafia were arrested in this swoop, the majority of whom turned out to have fled there from Sicily some time before.[40] They had as might be expected returned to traditional 'protection rackets,' reported to be very heavy in Reggio Calabria as they had once been in Sicily. Their trial was to last a year, during which 1,000 witnesses appeared against them with an unspecified number drawing long prison terms.

By mid-1935 it may be assumed that the Mafia had been reduced to a thin shadow of its former dimensions. And priorities in Italy had profoundly shifted as Mussolini had begun Italy's quest for big-power status and a prominent position in the Mediterranean as well as a belated influence as an African colonial entity. The growing hostility toward Mussolini and the Italian Fascist state in the English-speaking world found commendation of anything in Italy no longer fashionable, and most of what was to be learned about domestic affairs in Italy concerned matters discreditable to the regime.[41]

The last mention of the prosecution of the Mafia prior to the outbreak of World War II occurred in the third week of November, 1937, when 80 arrests occurred in Trapani and the contiguous areas of mountainous and relatively inaccessible western Sicily, and subsequently arraigned in Messina.[42] The press reports mentioned little about this other than it was a response to a "revival of Mafia activities," and there was nothing printed subsequently as to the outcome of this newest application of police power to the Sicilian Mafia.

Since the central theme of this narrative concerns the fate of the Mafia in Sicily and Italy, with only incidental reference to various international relationships growing out of this, the history of the Mafia in America has not been included except where the interlocking consequences of their joint existence becomes obvious.[43] Therefore the latter aspect has been treated as a peripheral subject. It is the Second World War which brings the two together to an even greater degree than prevailed in the 1920's and 1930's, at least in their connection to international politics. And it is as a consequence of the latter that the Mafia became something more than a domestic phenomenon in both Italy and the U.S.A. In Italy, what looked like extinction was turned around by the fortunes of the war, which became the salvation of the Mafia as a force in Italian affairs.

How this came about requires a summary of Mafia experiences in the United States in the decade between the ending of Prohibition and the Anglo-American invasion of Sicily as a phase of World War Two. From 1933 on, the legalisation of the manufacture, distribution and consumption of alcoholic beverages ended the phase of Mafia criminal opulence resulting from violation of the previous illegality of such enterprises. Undoubtedly things had begun to change in the relationships between the Mafia and the conventional world, and one of the major aspects of this was the steady penetration of legitimate business by Mafia money, influence and management, resulting in a degree of prosaic respectability which has grown steadily ever since. But organised crime still made the bulk of its money from control of gambling, prostitution and the ever-expanding extortion or 'protection' rackets, the latter much aided by the corruption of unions, none of which were affected adversely by the end of Prohibition. In fact, one of the new adjustments made by the Mafia was the substantial penetration of the new legitimate businesses supplying Americans with, beer, wine and whiskey. Much of the latter two were imported, and what was originally a minor enterprise of organised crime, the infiltration of the waterfront of the large port cities, became a very large one ultimately, with port facilities, some longshoremen's unions and all other functional aspects coming under their control. It was this situation which attended the preposterous incidents related to the extension of the war to Italy in the early 1940's.

There are two phases of the achievement of respectability by the Mafia via 'co-operation' with the military and naval intelligence arms of the U.S. war machine after American involvement in the war after December, 1941. One was recruitment in the famous wartime spy agency, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the ancestor of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the alleged supply of information about Sicily deemed crucial to the invasion planners prior to this event in July, 1943. The other concerned the alleged co-operation with naval intelligence in alerting them as to the existence of German and Italian spies on the New York waterfront and preventing such enemy espionage from penetrating the dock areas and destroying ships or facilities or perpetrating the dock areas and destroying ships or facilities or perpetrating related sabotage.

It now appears that such fears about spies and saboteurs were assiduously encouraged by American *Mafiosi*, especially after the big French luxury liner *Normandie* burned and capsized at its pier in New York harbour early in 1942. The nervousness of counter-intelligence after that and the thought that a series of such calamities might be in the offing led to the initiating of relationships with the Mafia and the creation of something called "Operation Underworld," a loose liaison between U.S. Naval Counter-Intelligence and various Mafia employed on or frequenting the wharves, in the interest of preventing anything else of this kind. But the Mafia may

have created the problem, and destroyed the big ship themselves, as one of the two most notorious Mafia hoodlums in American history, Charles "Lucky" Luciano, charges, in his recently published memoirs;[44] Italian or German agents had nothing to do with it. In an exaggerated way, the Mafia had simply expanded its 'protection' racket: in return for guarantees that no more such marine disasters would occur, they managed to provide themselves with an *entree* into the national defence area. The next step would be the ground work for subsequent promises of extensive information and assistance in the invasion of Sicily, which also came with a price. But to this day there is a thick shroud of official mystery over "Operation Underworld," and no government or service spokesmen have come forth to deny the substance of Luciano's allegations.

Another imponderable is the effect of the 'co-operation' pose of the Mafia upon political decisions within the Roosevelt regime and whether it led to looking the other way when it came to Mafia domestic activities, particularly in the instance of its running gambling and its tireless and expansive evasion of price controls, rationing and other wartime national and local economic restraints. The sums made in corrupting the ration stamp programme for gasoline, clothing and food and the similar fortunes made providing scarce, forbidden or rationed products, have never been determined. The entire episode was largely papered over by New Deal economists and historians, who sought to sell the public the legend concerning how honestly and efficiently wartime price control and rationing had worked.[45]

The recruitment of the Mafia in preparing for the invasion of Sicily is of a somewhat different order. It involved the actual placement of hoodlums in the intelligence services, and the related soliciting of information from others who remained outside. In the ex-CIA man R. Harris Smith's revealing book *OSS*, he discussed the selecting of 'Mafia types' for work with their operations in Italy, in what they called their 'Operational Group Command'.[46] Smith also pointed out that rather formidable criminal muscle was assembled from two of the most notorious killer gangs in the land, "Murder, Incorporated," of New York City, and the equally lethal, "Purple Gang" of Detroit.[47]

One aspect of this information-gathering from Mafia in advance of the assault on Sicily is as shrouded in mystery as that aspect which involved the mobilising of Mafia help in policing the New York docks. There are half a dozen differing accounts relating how the intelligence services went about seeking the favour of "Lucky" Luciano, with various henchmen emerging as the key figure in the negotiations. In one account it is Frank Costello, in another Meyer Lansky. Still other criminal luminaries appear to have been the person responsible. But in all the accounts two individuals always appear: Moses Polakoff, Luciano's principal legal advisor, and Murray R. Gurfein, a vigorous member of the team of prosecutors led by Thomas E. Dewey which brought about Luciano's conviction and jailing in 1936. Gurfein, an assistant district attorney for the State of New York before the war, is identified as affiliated with Military Intelligence[48] in some sources after the war began, and is asserted to be a colonel in the OSS[49] in Europe later in the war. (Gurfein, elevated to a federal judgeship in June, 1971, became famous for his first decision, in favour of the New York *Times* when the federal government sought to prevent that newspaper from printing the famed "Pentagon Papers," a decision which was later upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court.)

The unsatisfactory aspects of the Luciano case have gradually surfaced as time has passed, and the suspicion grows that there never was much of anything of substance connected with it. Some labyrinthine proceeding related to the 1936 conviction appears to have been far more important than anything concerning any help provided to the invasion forces, however. In his own memoirs, Luciano in two separate and vehement scatological commentaries denied having been of *any* assistance whatever to any branch of the armed services in the preparation or conduct of the Sicilian invasion,[50] but that he went along with the creation of the legend connected with it, knowing he was telling nothing but lies all the time. (On one occasion, recalling a particularly spirited but fictitious retelling of the tale, in 1954, Luciano remarked in an aside that his theatrics in inventing imaginary details connected with his bogus part in the Sicilian invasion should have earned him an Academy Award.) In retrospect the most lugubrious aspect of the entire Luciano *cum* Sicily affair was the ludicrous patina of patriotism and related sentiments which it gradually acquired.

What Luciano knew about Sicily probably could have been supplied to Intelligence figures by anyone familiar with a library. As he protested later, he had been about nine years old when he emigrated from the island, and had no contacts there of any significance. In the large book which included his verbatim memoirs he never once mentioned a single Mafia figure known to have survived the Mussolini suppression campaign in Italy or Sicily, only Vito Genovese, an equally notorious American Mafia associate who had returned to Italy in 1937 to escape prosecution after Luciano's conviction, and Luciano expressed unbounded distaste for Genovese. This development will be elaborated upon as it results in still another complicated intertwining of international Mafia involvements after the invasion.



Charles "Lucky" Luciano

It was Luciano's assertion that the entire thing had been fabricated to provide a cover for his pardon by Dewey, who became governor of New York after his sensational career as a prosecuting district attorney, proceeding against organised crime, a route to the governor's mansion in several states for others who had performed a similar role elsewhere. Luciano maintained that he had been framed by Dewey's office, that the prostitution ring which flourished under his aegis was a 'moonlighting' operation carried out by

underlings, about which he knew nothing, and that his conviction had been made possible by perjured testimony on the part of women who claimed relationships with him which were totally imaginary. Luciano further stated that after his conviction his lawyers patiently went about confronting these witnesses and secured from each of them an affidavit admitting that they had been encouraged to lie about Luciano in return for promises of luxurious vacations and other 'fringe benefits,' most of which never had been made good, thus embittering them against the prosecution.

When Luciano was convicted, a stipulation in his sentence provided that he was to be deported upon completion of serving his sentence,[51] originally 30 to 50 years, to be served in the bleakest of the New York state penitentiaries, Dannemora. So the issue of deportation was not in question, it was *when* this might happen. Luciano and Polakoff contended that even before the war was well along that they had sufficient new evidence and affidavits of relapsed witnesses to begin proceedings against Dewey and his co-operating staff for a gigantic rigging of his case, based on subornation involving all key witnesses. Therefore, with the now-governor and others connected with him knowing this, the next step was to be an effort to hurry along a pardon so that deportation proceedings could be swiftly pursued and the whole impending scandal averted.[52]

At this point the blending of the keep-the-waterfront-free-from-saboteurs and the aid-the-invasion-of-Sicily enterprises involving the Mafia took place, and Luciano's underworld friends with high political and other connections began the operation which was to lead to Luciano's pardon and deportation shortly after the end of World War Two. The sudden change in Luciano's domicile from Dannemora to the somewhat more salubrious circumstances of Great Meadow prison at Comstock, N.Y., near Albany was the most instructive indication that the understanding between organised crime and the armed forces intelligence operatives had been fleshed out. From 1942 on the secret meetings between Luciano and youthful Lieut. Commander Charles R. Haffenden took place there, though a stream of Mafia underworld figures also appeared regularly for audiences with Luciano, appropriately explained as part of the working aspects of "Operation Underworld" in keeping the New York waterfront free of Axis subversives.

In the meantime the OSS went about creating their separate team of spies and assistance elements for work in Sicily,[53] though Allied Intelligence in North Africa were not entranced with the quality of information which came to them in the period immediately preceding the invasion, and one authoritative account declares that in that crucial time all native informers were ignored except those with Sicilian Mafia associates.[54]

The literature and stories concerning the fabled assistance the Mafia furnished in the Anglo-American assault on Sicily is confusing and contradictory. The failure of anyone ever to put on the record any convincing facts and the persisting vague and mock-mysterious abstruseness about it all has encouraged the suspicion that much of the episode was fabricated, and that advanced the belief that not only was Luciano telling the truth when he disclaimed having the slightest thing to do with providing information helpful to the Sicilian operation, but that little if any help was received from any other Mafia either, whether living in the U.S.A. or Sicily.

The Allies overran Sicily in 39 days, between July 10 and August 18, 1943. The part taken easiest was the western half of the island, reputedly that area where the vestiges of the Mafia survived underground. But in what was essentially a military operation undertaken with overwhelming force, the assumption would have to be that the help supplied by a ragtag of criminals infiltrated in the civilian population would of necessity be nominal, if perceptible.

Even recent sources still assert that Luciano supplied invasion officers with contacts with Sicily's only unjailed Mafia chief of any substance, Don Calogero Vizzini, and also with Genco Russo, the overseer of the immense land holdings in Western Sicily of Prince Raimondo Lanza di Trabia, who was the personal aide to Major General Giacomo Carboni, one time chief of the Italian Military Intelligence Service, one of the chief plotters behind the original deposition of Mussolini, and ultimately put in command of the mobile defence force for the city of Rome on July 14, 1943.[55]

In view of Luciano's repudiation of any involvement of this kind, and his failure as well as that of his literary co-operators Gosch and Hammer even to mention Vizzini's name in a book of almost 500 pages, this must be viewed as corroborating support for Luciano's insistence on total non-participation. Assuming that the contacts mentioned above took place, it would appear that intelligence assistance to the invasion had help which went far beyond a pathetic scattering of Mafia vestiges, and which in part, at least, can be traced back to the staff of Italy's intelligence chief and his aide, an owner of vast estates in the path of the invasion.

Cheering Sicilians greet U.S. troops entering Monreale during the allied invasion of Sicily in 1943.

At any rate, the plethora of stories connecting Luciano with one aspect or another of the Sicilian campaign are still with us. The World War Two British army officer Norman Lewis, in his book *The Honoured Society: A Searching Look at the Mafia*,[56] asserted that tanks went ashore actually flying yellow flags bearing the black letter "L," which purportedly stood for Luciano, and probably the most astounding fable connected with the event alleged that Luciano himself was a part of the invasion forces, despite unchallengeable evidence that the influential Mafia chief was ensconced in his cell at Great Meadows penitentiary throughout the operation, and after.[57]

As for the political new order established in the

wake of the Allied military operations, we have more solid substance here, and less of the opaque evanescence attending the alleged intelligence and strategic genius of the Mafia prior to the attack on Sicily. As the structure of civilian society takes shape, one sees the Allied military and occupation leaders emptying the prisons and labour camps of the Mussolini regime,[58] turning loose back upon Sicily, and southern Italy, eventually, a legion of convicted murderers, robbers and extortionists, as well as setting them up in business as the mayors of a long string of Sicilian communities, "*Mafiosi* to a man," as Lewis puts it. To justify loosing the Mafia from jail the Allied policy makers invented the notion that they were "Victims of Fascist tyranny,"[59] thus converting them into instant political prisoners, though what they really accomplished was the rebuilding of the Mafia's "state within a state," as Lewis described their pre-1926 enclave.[60]

Thus it should have come as no surprise to anyone, least of all the Anglo-American 'liberators,' that intricately integrated organised crime was flourishing in Sicily within a few weeks of 'victory.'[61]

The 'liberators' brought something else in their train besides the Mafia: a rocketing inflation and an accompanying black market which dwarfed that which prevailed under Mussolini. The predecessor of both had been seen in North Africa, where they had achieved memorable dimensions. The monetary disorder resulting from Anglo-American policies there had even resulted in a scolding in *Business Week*, which concluded (March 13, 1943, p. 48): "The U.S. and British have yet to learn what the Germans have taught; occupation is made easier if money rates are unchanged or altered in favour of the local people."[62]

The American branch of the Mafia having squirreled away a vast fortune through their major hand in the Stateside black market, it was not out of character that the revivified Sicilian and Italian Mafia would promptly follow in their steps, when given the chance. The combination of the ridiculous debasement of the money system and the mountain of desirable products brought to the Mediterranean by the Occupation provided the foundation. The stealing of supplies from the armed forces or the bribing of personnel to supply them became a major Mafia industry.[63] After a period of innocent wonderment, Occupation police began to react, but in most situations it might have been easier to bail out the Mediterranean with a sieve than to eliminate the black market flourishing on all sides. Nevertheless a brave attempt was made. On September 9, 1943 authorities reported the arrest in Sicily of two Mafia chiefs, Domenico Tomaselli and Giuseppe Piraino, in a coup which allegedly smashed the black market operations there.[64] In an effort to divert responsibility it was also alleged that the Fascisti had mobilised the Mafia in its own aid,[65] though this sharply contradicted the program of release from Mussolini's prisons and penal camps of the very people who were supposed to be in Fascism's employ. This convenient line appealed to liberals, however, and was still being repeated thirty years later.

But blaming Mussolini again had no influence on the sustained progress of the Mafia and the black market. A year later a succession of dispatches from Sicily reported that the Mafia were rampant in Sicily.[66] The gang system had reappeared, and Palermo was once more the scene of numerous hold-ups and kidnappings, and repeated press commentaries outlined the scope of the familiar outrages.[67] Most Sicilian communities by the end of October, 1944 were so insecure that virtually no one could be found to travel outside their perimeters at night, a social situation which repeated, under far different circumstances, the realities of the European walled towns of the 12th century.

In January and February, 1945 the Mafia were reported affluent and flourishing on the crest of a major Sicilian crime wave,[68] to be followed by a succession of sensational stories in the New York *Times* on the spread of gangsterism to Rome,[69] another accompaniment to the advance of the 'liberation' up the Italian mainland.

On the heels of this expectable development came the announcement on November 24, 1944 that one of the most elusive and secretive of all of America's Mafia leaders, Vito Genovese, had been arrested by Army occupation police,[70] who were working in collaboration with Stateside authorities, in connection with an unsolved murder, that of a minor Mafia hoodlum named Ferdinand "The Shadow" Boccia in Brooklyn dating back to 1934. Genovese was 'discovered' living in a luxurious apartment in Naples, and working as an interpreter for and advisor to Military Government, with high clearance and passes which authorised him to travel any place in Italy which was in the hands of the 'Allies.'[71]

Local authorities had instituted the search for Genovese, who had quietly left the U.S.A. for Italy in 1937[72] in the wake of the conviction of Luciano, expecting to be next on the Dewey prosecution list. Following a re-opening of the Boccia case after a hearing in a Brooklyn court during August, 1944 where one of Boccia's killers in 1934 implicated Genovese and indicated the existence of a third person who had witnessed Genovese's involvement,[73] co-operation took place between the local authorities and U.S. Military Government in Naples. Here a separate investigation of Genovese was going on as a phase of the exposure of a formidable black market he had been running since at least the 'Allied' occupation of the area,[74] right under the noses of the naive military governors with whom he worked in close collaboration almost daily, and who considered his aid and service indispensable.[75] It is probably as a reaction to the embarrassment that followed that an effort was made to try to conceal the realities of the moment by implying that Genovese had shady political ties with the overthrown Fascisti and that he had done the same things under their aegis that were being uncovered under the new dispensation. One energetic Army counter-intelligence bloodhound even tried to make Genovese out as a German spy.

An unexplained circumstance to this day is the agonisingly slow movement of the extradition proceedings, and the discreet burying of the whole matter for many months after his arrest. Genovese was still in Italy six months after his apprehension, and his arrival in America and arraignment for complicity in the Boccia murder did not take place until June 2, 1945.[76] Genovese pleaded innocent when arraigned in Kings County Court, having hired as his attorney Hyman Barshay, counsel years earlier for the sinister killer Louis "Lepke" Buchalter, a key figure in the Murder, Incorporated gang.[77]

The death of a key witness against Genovese while lodged in jail and the dismissal of charges of involvement in the Boccia killing against Genovese, on the grounds of insufficient evidence, on June 10, 1946, is incidental to this account.[78] But an immense tale grew up around Genovese and what he had being doing in Italy between 1937 and 1944,

much of it ex post facto and based on not very credible assertions by hostile fellow gangsters, and his estranged wife, when she testified at divorce proceedings in 1952. These versions tried to make Genovese a celebrity in the Fascist regime in the years between his return to Italy and his arrest, and attributed all manner of wondrous involvements. But they did not try to allege that he had anything to do with the Sicilian Mafia vestiges in those years (Genovese was a native of Naples, not Sicily), or that he was the spark behind the rebirth of organised crime all through the region which fell to the Anglo-American armed forces beginning in midsummer of 1943.[79]

In the meantime the war had ended, and attorneys for "Lucky" Luciano entered his petition for clemency before Governor Dewey of New York on the very day hostilities ceased in Europe, May 7, 1945.[80] Another tangled tale is connected with the events related to the eventual pardon of Luciano. His lawyer Polakoff was the first to tell the story to the press of his alleged assistance to the Mediterranean warriors, and naming Gurfein as the key person who had suggested that Luciano's aid be recruited. As the New York *Times* quoted Polakoff on this and related details, on May 23, "Through information the convict (Luciano) furnished the military from his cell in Great Meadows prison in 1942, many Sicilian-born Italians furnished information regarding the conditions in Sicily that was helpful to the armed forces in the invasion."[81]

Governor Dewey was ambivalent on the case. On January 3, 1946, in a comment on Luciano's co-operation with the armed forces, he added, "the actual value of the information procured is not clear."[82] But a few weeks later, when he pardoned Luciano, his attitude was somewhat more positive, and Luciano's usefulness to the U.S. Army in the Sicilian invasion was the reason given for this action,[83] which many continued to think was far too hasty and precipitate. For some time the responsibility for the action was traded back and forth between Dewey and the N.Y. State Parole Board, and the subject was to become an issue of fitful significance for years thereafter. Luciano's deportation took place a few days after his pardon; the story of his return to Italy on a small ship and arrival in Naples the last day of February, 1946 has been retold almost as often as the first voyage of Columbus to America.[84]

Luciano's reappearance in the Western Hemisphere the following year via South America and then Cuba, followed by a major gathering of Mafia figures after his arrival, led to another round of unhappy commentaries on Dewey's action on his behalf, and the press once more interviewed Gurfein[85] and Haffenden[86] on Luciano's wartime role in furnishing counter-intelligence and other aid during the war; now his part was being designated as "alleged" and the more hyperthyroid sentiments which had been expressed in 1945 and 1946 had subsided. Haffenden by the time this new review of the Luciano business was under way was himself in a big scandal (actually two separate ones) related to deals with outlawed stevedoring companies on the New York docks, and had been removed from his job as commander of the New York City Marine and Aviation Department by Mayor O'Dwyer,[87] this rancorous incident was still being churned over by all concerned in 1949. But the February, 1947 observations about Luciano were drastically subdued and discounted compared to what had taken place a year earlier.

As for Gov. Dewey, he functioned under clouds of suspicion for years, and his troubles over the Luciano pardon accelerated. He was constantly under charges of having made enigmatic deals, and when Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee began to assemble his machine for the investigation of organised crime in America in 1951, he contributed to the tangle of allegations with the charge that the commutation of Luciano's sentence by Dewey was not justified.[88]

While the press, military and political figures were trying to decide whether or not "Lucky" Luciano was to be enshrined by history as a patriot, the Italian mainland and Sicily were putting up with the mixed blessings of the new

Representing Sicily's two governments, a carabiniere and a mafioso stand outside a Brancaccio polling station to supervise elections to the Regional Assembly (1959).

order brought to their midst by the Occupation. Another big crime wave swept both in January and February, 1946,[89] and in Sicily the term 'banditry' turned out to be the euphemism applied to renewed Mafia labours.[90] Ultimately the mixture of liberal leftists and social democrats which U.S. occupation policy decreed should be Italy's new leadership found that they were forced to use the same strategy Mussolini had used in putting down widespread organised crime, although they ultimately used far more force in doing so than "Il Duce" ever employed in supporting the campaigns of Prefect Mori.

Though the 'liberators' were responsible for attaching a political and ideological significance to the Mafia, they were not prepared for the massive extension of this approach by the new post-war developments in the criminal scene. Though Mori had engaged in open warfare with the Mafia and fought encounters which involved enough men to rate as battles when they had taken place between rival States, the situation facing post-1945 Italy turned out to be considerably worse. It mainly revolved around the celebrated Salvatore Giuliani and his followers. Between 1946 and 1950 he became the best known Sicilian 'bandit' of the entire modern era, and he and his followers earned as much space in the newspapers of the world as many of the global politicians in these first few years of the burgeoning Cold War.

To be sure, the weak and wobbling political front making believe running Italy in the wake of the demoralising defeat which capped two previous years of accelerating disasters was not ready to cope with something such as the Giuliani diversion. And it did not compare with what was customarily expected in Sicily. With Palmiro Togliatti back from Moscow and the Stalinists in a position to move into power, it was the unenviable job of the opportunists and camp followers who inherited the debris of 1945 to try to curry Occupation support by adopting a political stance hostile to both a Red take-over and a revival of the Fascists, the nominal rallying point for anti-Stalinism. What nonplussed the shaken 'vital centre' of Italy about the Giuliani element in Sicily was *its* political stance. Beginning with a shootout on May 1, 1946 with the Reds, which the latter called a 'massacre,'[91] the Giuliani 'bandits,' as the press there and in the U.S.A. always called them, staged a daring attack on a radio station in Palermo on September 20.[92] All that fall there were reports of new outbreaks of 'bandit' activity and increased police reaction in Sicily. Following an assault on two Communist clubs on June 23, 1947 Giuliani announced a declaration of war upon all Italian Communists, and began issuing calls for recruits to his cause. Three months later his men made an even bolder attack on a *carabinieri* guardhouse in Montelegripe.[93]

Just what the exotic Giuliani affair was about is not easy to fathom. A handsome and literate revolutionary, his program escaped understanding in most circles. At one time he claimed he was the leader of a movement to attach Sicily to the United States. Then he changed to concentrating on opposition to the Communists, who were considered the likely inheritors of national power from 1946 on. In this Giuliani had the early support of the Mafia, who were now as 'anti-communist' as they had been 'anti-fascist' a year and a half earlier. With his open rebellion came a renewed flourish of lengthy pronouncements which the newspapers were delighted to print.

Now the regime began to apply muscle to Giuliani. Large police forces were assigned to pursue him in the Sicilian mountains in the west. Though the Communist-saturated labour unions tried to add their weight to the government's prosecution by staging a one day strike in Sicily,[94] their attempt to execute a General Confederation of Labour strike nationwide in protesting against Giuliani was a failure,[95] and the offensive passed over into the hands of the regime's police. The two antagonists traded blows, the police killing some of Giuliani's 'bandits'[96] while they succeeded in evading a police trap and killing the police commander in Palermo, in the fall of 1947.[97]

In 1948 the regime declared Giuliani to be public enemy number one,[98] but sought for him fruitlessly. The buildup of police forces scouring Sicily for him mounted steadily, and by the spring of 1949 had 8,000 *carabinieri* in the field against him and his small band.[99] The year was featured by steady month-by-month guerrilla warfare, with the inheritors of Mussolini's job of maintaining law and order forced to employ manpower and tactics which far more closely resembled some campaigns of the recently-concluded war than they did the maintenance of domestic tranquillity, as well as employing heavily armed police on a scale which made Mussolini's efforts of 1926-1934 look like mere outings by comparison. There were no more unhinged leftist liberals execrating the heavy reliance on the most exaggerated violent measures now; they were the beneficiaries of it all, not bystanders as they had been during the heyday of Prefect Mori.

On July 5, 1950 the Minister of the Interior, Mario Scelba, announced that Giuliani had been shot and killed by police in a battle at Castelvetrano, in Sicily, and that the massive offensive against his supporters was now being wound down.[100] But the matter did not disappear from attention that fast. Rumours built up for some time thereafter, and it was finally admitted that he had been murdered in his sleep by a cousin, one Gaspare Pisciotta, under conditions which reminded some of the legend of Jesse James. It was obvious that Giuliani had lost the favour of the Mafia, however, and there were suspicions they had plotted his murder.

Pisciotta was lodged in the ominous Ucciardone prison in Palermo for nearly four years, while police continued to arrest and jail Giuliani 'bandits.' The Communists kept a drum fire going alleging that the Mafia had engineered the Giuliani killing, though they had no real reason to be upset over the demise of an anti-communist other than to create an embarrassment for Scelba, who was no friend of theirs either, the event simply being an occasion to take comfort out of all angles of it.

After a considerable silence Pisciotta announced early in February, 1954 that he would have some significant things to say about the Giuliani affair at a special hearing. This hearing never occurred nor did the 'documents' Pisciotta claimed he had ever surface.

On February 9 Pisciotta died in prison after drinking a cup of coffee which was alleged to have been laced with poison, and a furious controversy broke out which approached the dimensions of a national scandal. Charges were made that major political leaders were involved in setting up the Giuliani machine-gunning of the May Day, 1946 Communist meeting, and that they had also bribed Pisciotta to murder Giuliani. The threat of Pisciotta to 'tell all' about his connections with the Mafia and with political notables from at least two political parties and the ruling regime was asserted to be the reason for his sudden death.[101] Shortly after, 63 members of Giuliani's gang were sentenced

to prison in a mass trial in Palermo on May 13, 1954 under circumstances which closely compared with the mass trials conducted in the Mussolini era, but no one called attention to that.[102] The whole matter was quickly submerged in the far more sensational Wilma Montesi scandal which was brewing simultaneously with the closing stages of the Giuliani business, and in some respects overlapped.[103]

In the meantime the Mafia went about its quiet and diligent mending of fences, re-establishing control and influence and amassing substance on a scale again which outdid anything enjoyed before 1926 by many magnitudes, a total program which dovetailed with the conventional world of business and politics to the point where it took experts to be able to distinguish the component parts of the total situation.[104]

The evolution of a novel approach to social order in liberal circles, which looks upon a certain level of mayhem as an endurable price to pay for a 'free society,' has been utilised to explain and rationalise whatever may be prevailing in a culture which makes it incapable of controlling murder, aggravated assault and rape. After demonstrating debility in law enforcement long enough, it may be expectable that a plausible excuse will appear in order to convince the unhappy that what prevails perhaps should be considered either 'normal' or a 'moderate' solution. In a cultural environment where such a climate of opinion prevails, it can be taken almost for granted that law enforcement such as that exemplified by Mussolini in reducing the Sicilian Mafia will always be deplored and reasons to denounce it as infamous.

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NOTES

[1]A condensation of this essay was published in the Spring, 1975 issue of the *American Mercury*.

[2]The best description of this sordid affair is by two collaborators with the Reds in northern Italy, Pier Luigi Bellini delle Stelle and Urbano Lazzaro, in their book *Dongo: The Last Act*, first published by Mondadori in Italy in 1962, and by MacDonald in London two years later, when it received the John Florio Italian Translation Prize. The role played by Italy's loyal Stalinists in the Mussolini murder has been a part of the public record since the Rome newspaper *l'Unita* in 1945, and in greater detail in 1947, revealed that the Italian CP leader Palmiro Togliatti, brought back to Italy by Americans late in 1944, issued orders through party headquarters to shoot Mussolini and other Fascist leaders immediately upon capture. New York *Times*, March 9, 1947, p. 18. Two weeks later, Walter Audisio, using the wartime pseudonym 'Colonel Valerio,' was identified as Mussolini's 'executioner.' He tried to implicate U.S. Military Governor Charles Poletti, a one-time lieutenant governor of the state of New York, as having approved in advance the murder of Mussolini and the Fascist party chief, Achille Starace. Poletti heatedly denied Audisio's allegation. New York *Times*, March 23, 1947, p. 5; March 31, 1947, p. 5; April 1, 1947, p. 18. Audisio was subsequently rewarded with a seat in the post-war Italian chamber of deputies, remaining until his death on October 11, 1973 at the age of 64. See obituarial note in New York *Times*, October 13, 1973, p. 38, and Associated Press report on his part in Mussolini's murder in Colorado Springs *Gazette Telegraph*, October 12, 1973, p. 3-C. Especially useful for other aspects of the above matters is Luigi Villari, *The Liberation of Italy, 1943-1947* (Appleton, Wisconsin: C.C. Nelson, 1959.)

[3]Rev. ed., Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948, p. 989.

[4]New York *Times*, September 26, 1926, p. 24.

[5]New York *Times*, May 1, 1926, p. 1.

[6]New York *Times*, May 2, 1926, sec. IX, p. 11.

[7]New York *Times*, May 1, 1926, p. 1.

[8]New York *Times*, October 23, 1927, sec. III, p. 1.

[9]New York *Times*, January 12, 1928, p. 3.

[10]New York *Times*, January 22, 1928, sec. IX, p. 2.

[11]New York *Times*, February 9, 1928, p. 1.

[12]New York *Times*, March 7, 1928, p. 6.

[13]New York *Times*, March 8, 1928, p. 6.

[14]One finds an occasional account which seeks to describe the Lipari Islands penal camps as versions of Devil's Island, but they were resorts compared to those already long established in the Soviet Union. The Italian camps were far from escape-proof, nor were all those sentenced to serve time there kept for their full time. Escapes and reduction of sentences were hardly unknown as the program was expanded.

[15]New York *Times*, January 16, 1928, p. 5.

[16]"Mori's War on the Mafia," New York *Times*, January 17, 1928, p. 28.

[17]Cortesi, "The Mafia Dead, A New Sicily Born," New York *Times*, March 4, 1928, sec. V, pp. 10-11. See also the major stories on Mori in New York *Times*, January 22, 1928, sec. IX, p. 2 and March 11, 1928, sec. III, p. 5. Many times decorated for his campaign against the Mafia, Mori died in 1942.

[18]Guy Talese, in his extremely popular bestseller, *Honor Thy Father* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Books, 1971), alleges that Mussolini began the drive to wipe out the Mafia because on a visit there his hat had been stolen, and that he was outraged later by the patronising attitude of a local official who was also a member of the Mafia. Talese perhaps more than any other recent writer on the Mafia has been most offended by the Mussolini anti-Mafia program, and has sought to pose them as heroes of a sort, rationalising their resistance as some kind of political guerrilla warfare and ultimately seeking to elevate them to a kind of patriot status on the basis of their behaviour in World War Two.

The effort to attribute patriotic and politically ideological qualities to the Mafia in World War Two does not wash. Talese admits (p. 488) that no Mafia can survive without government collusion and support. Mussolini put it out of business in a short time, and even in a Cuba which rivalled Sicily in poverty, the Mafia was swiftly run out of its entrenched position in a matter of days by the Castro revolution. The Mafia's willingness to co-operate with the U.S.A. to do in the Communist Castro was barely distinguishable from its calculated readiness to work with the same U.S.A. to do in the Fascist Mussolini, earlier. Ideology was a light year away from the central core of the issue, which was the hope of overturning a non-co-operating political establishment and the expectation of having it replaced by one which would tolerate at least some attenuated level of mutual existence with organised crime.

[19]"Mussolini Aims Drive on Sardinian Bandits," New York *Times*, February 19, 1928, p. 5. This aspect of the program is the worst reported of all, and the record is badly documented. It may be assumed to have been as successful as the others, however; the veteran writer on Italian affairs, Melton S. Davis, in his *Who Defends Rome? The Forty-five Days, July 25 to September 8, 1943* (New York: Dial Press, 1972), mentioned specifically that at the time of the 1943 invasion of Sicily, "there was no Mafia in Sardinia" (p. 258).

With respect to the adjoining island of Corsica, a French department north of Sardinia, it was fully as notorious as Sicily and Sardinia as a sanctuary of organised crime and, in the eyes of criminals themselves, perhaps even more formidable. Charles "Lucky" Luciano, referring to the consequences of the opening up of Cuba to Mafia-Syndicate gambling via the ministrations of Meyer Lansky to the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1933, and the subsequent spread to Nassau and other Caribbean locations, felt that Mafia operations would soon expand to European sites as well. However he shrank from the thought of a 'war' with the Corsicans, whom he characterised as "real cannibals" compared to anything the American-based organised crime rings had come up with when it came to the application of violence. That anyone could impress Luciano concerning the revolting conditions that attended their murderous enterprise is indeed an impressive tribute to the Corsican underworld, if distinctions of this sort can be deemed worthy of notice. See Martin A. Gosch and Richard Hammer, *The Last Testament of Lucky Luciano* (New York: Dell paperback edition, 1976), pp. 172-173. On collaboration between the Corsican criminal element and the American intelligence organisation, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), see note 53.

[20]In the 1920's it took an average of 60 columns of tiny print just to *list* the articles dealing with Prohibition and its violation and enforcement in the annual issues of the New York *Times Index*. It is to be understood that the local press of the nation covered a prodigious number of stories on the same subject which never found their way into the *Times*. It is probable that a full history of Prohibition would be so bulky it might take a forklift to get it off the ground.

[21]New York *Times*, May 31, 1925.

[22]Organised crime related to Prohibition was a major factor in the land prior to public awareness of the big gangs involved in profiting from its evasion, an awareness probably taking place at about the time the gang leader Dion O'Banion was murdered in Chicago on November 10, 1924. The ferocious stand-off between and ultimate co-operation among the Mafia and the major Jewish racketeers, the gang wars of the 1920's and 1930's and the emergence

of what has been known for years as the 'Kosher Nostra' are well described by Hank Messick in his absorbing book *Lansky* (rev. ed., Berkley Medallion Books, 1973); they are examined in their recent activities by the columnist Jack Anderson in his famous report " 'Kosher Nostra' in the Promised Land," published in most newspapers carrying his column on December 31, 1971, largely concerned with the efforts of "a disturbing number of Jewish racketeers" to turn Israel into "a criminal sanctuary."

[23]Not to be identified with the independent Midwestern and Southern bootleggers of the first decade of Prohibition are the bank robbers and kidnappers of the early 1930's, from the same regions, in the main, memorialised in the book by Lew Louderback, *The Bad Ones* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Books, 1968). One can grasp the obviously superior effectiveness of crime working with sympathetic police and politicians, as in the case of the Mafia/Syndicate, as compared with the defiant loners against the world, in the persons of John Dillinger, "Pretty Boy" Floyd, Clyde Barrow, "Machine Gun" Kelly, "Ma" Barker, Alvin Karpis and "Baby Face" Nelson.

[24]New York *Times*, December 25, 1928, p. 10.

[25]On the arrest of five returned bootleggers in Naples engaged in this enterprise see New York *Times*, February 15, 1927, p. 5. Most of the plots against Mussolini were hatched by Italian refugees in France, which was also the destination of some of the Mafia escaping from the Lipari Islands penal camps. On the re-capture of Lipari Islands escapees and their re-trial see New York *Times*, January 23, 1930, p. 4.

A related aspect of Mafia undertakings which has almost disappeared from the record in recent accounts is alien smuggling. When the big Mafia *capo* Salvatore Maranzano was murdered in New York on September 10, 1931 there were *two* separate investigations which followed: one by local authorities seeking his killers, estimated to be from four to six men, depending upon which account one reads, and the other by the federal government exploring his alien-smuggling business. An illegal alien himself, Maranzano had built a rather wide-ranging operation and the New York *Times* in the fall of 1931 boiled with stories on the big alien-smuggling apparatus uncovered, tendrils of which were traced to Canada and as far away as Germany. It was revealed that Maranzano had corresponded with U.S. immigration officials earlier on the subject, and for awhile at least the latter were more interested in this matter than they were in finding who had killed him. One witness interviewed by the federal investigators declared that there had been twelve witnesses to his murder. New York *Times*, September 26, 1931, p. 4.

[26]New York *Times*, November 6, 1926, p. 1; November 21, 1926, p. 16.

[27]Mussolini was shot and slightly wounded by Violet Albina Gibson, sister of Lord Ashbourne, as the former emerged from a speech-making appearance in a public building in Rome on April 6, 1926. New York *Times*, April 7, 1926, p. 1.

[28]New York *Times*, January 14, 1929, p. 7.

[29]New York *Times*, March 1, 1929, p. 10. Four members of the gang were reported to have died while awaiting the outcome of the trial.

[30]New York *Times*, May 2, 1929, p. 2. On the significance of the revelations that the convicted had co-operated with the Mafia in America, see New York *Times*, May 5, 1929, sec. III, p. 3.

[31]New York *Times*, July 5, 1930, p. 7; July 8, 1930, p. 4.

[32]New York *Times*, June 23, 1931, p. 1; "Mafia is Further Weakened by Many New Convictions," June 28, 1931, sec. VIII, p. 15. It was stated in the later account that there had been 450 convictions since mid-1928.

[33]One would never know from reading Talese's *Honor Thy Father* that the Mafia were subject to formal trial before traditional courts under Italian law and were represented by substantial entourages of defence lawyers. He dismisses the crackdown on the Mafia as a mere "campaign of terror" which consisted mainly of "torturing" suspects and of killing a great many of them "without a fair trial." In view of the heavy coverage of the entire campaign in the New York *Times*, Talese's employer when he wrote the above book, it appears that he effectively avoided consulting the record in the press contemporary with the events.

Mario Puzo, in his novel *The Godfather* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Books, 1969), another immensely popular volume built around the Mafia, preceded Talese in suggesting that the Mussolini drive starting in 1926 simply authorised the arbitrary arrest of anyone suspected of being a *mafioso*, while alleging that many "innocent families" were "brought ruin" as a result. Prefect Mori is honestly represented as "a high police official," but one would also never know from this book that at least half of the persons brought to trial between 1926 and 1934 were found innocent: they hardly were all thrown into jail or deported to penal work colonies without exception (pp. 277-278).

[34]New York *Times*, July 10, 1930, p. 8. Witnesses following the Rosario murder testified that the Mafia killed all relatives of victims as well, to prevent revenge. New York *Times*, July 12, 1930, p. 5.

[35]New York *Times*, December 7, 1930, sec. III, p. 2. In *Honor Thy Father*, Talese impugns Mori, and conveys the impression he was an *ex*-policeman, and by inference, nothing but a coarse goon hired by 'fascist thugs,' rather than a career policeman who had served under several regimes prior to that of Mussolini, who, after all, was the recognised chief of state. Talese's cavalier brush-off of Mori stands in strange comparison to the numerous contemporary tributes to the latter's competence and devotion to duty while in serious danger to his own life from Mafia killers. These accolades, such as that of McClure, made their way into the press of the world outside of Italy on a substantial scale, the most flattering perhaps appearing in the pages of the New York *Times*. Talese also delicately avoids mentioning the substantial number of Italian police who were killed or injured by Mafia gunmen during this virtual civil war in Sicily.

An earlier writer, Frederic Sondern, was somewhat more fair in his estimate. He identified Mori correctly and described him as "able" and "energetic," admitting he had a difficult job, yet Sondern also called the trials in Sicily "drumhead" affairs. But he concludes that Mafia activities "ceased almost entirely," and that the "extortion rackets, robberies, smuggling, feuds and murders dipped sharply. " In addition to the Lipari Islands, Sondern stated that some of the convicted Mafia were sent to Ustica, a small volcanic island in the Tyrrhenian Sea, 40 miles north-northwest of Palermo, and administered by Palermo province. Sondern, "How the Mafia Came to America," in Nicholas Gage, ed., *Mafia, U.S.A.* (Chicago: Playboy Press, 1972), pp. 78-79.

[36]New York *Times*, November 30, 1931, p. 4.

[37]Delayed commentary on the convictions appeared in the New York *Times*, May 3, 1932, p. 10.

[38]New York *Times*, above.

[39]New York *Times*, June 26, 1932, sec. II, p. 4. In the year ending in March 1932 New York City police reported 489 murders; there were seven murderers executed in the same time. New York *Times*, April 11, 1932, p. 7.

[40]New York *Times*, June 23, 1934, p. 30; June 25, 1934, p. 14.

[41]Mussolini's success in challenging the British in the Mediterranean and his overpowering of Ethiopia in 1935-1936, as well as flouting the League of nations 'sanction,' infuriated a large sector of British opinion, and the reaction to him in most quarters was in the class with the incredulous stupefaction of the admiral of the fleet upon having soup poured down his back by a clumsy waiter. The systematic defamation of Italians was an outgrowth of the continuous detraction of Mussolini as an oaf and clown which grew in volume and intensity throughout the war. The universal character assassination of Italians probably reached a peak with the publication of Field Marshal Montgomery's memoirs in London on November 1, 1958, in which his imputation of cowardice on the part of Italian troops in North Africa during World War Two so enraged nationalists that the leader of an Italian veterans' organisation, Vincenzo Caputo, challenged him to a duel. Montgomery declined to take him up on it, and after a number of diplomatic and other protests from the Italian government and much mumbling from London, Montgomery 'reappraised' his estimate of the Italian soldier and heaped belated approval upon him. New York *Times*, November 7, 1958, p. 8; November 12, 1958, p. 3. A recent book published in England seeks to reduce some of the misconceptions about Mussolini among the British, Roy MacGregor-Hastie's *The Day of the Lion* (London: MacDonald, 1963.)

[42]New York *Times*, November 20, 1937, p. 5.

[43]The succession of books about the history and development of the Mafia manages to tell us little. Each writer cannibalises his predecessors and the same story reappears over and over again, embellished sometimes with fictional overtones. They are obsessed with how the *Mafiosi* treat one another, and devote much space to gory blow-by-blow accounts of how the various sub-divisions of this collection of super-robber/super-murderer elements conduct mutual massacres. Few accounts of the Mafia tell us much about how they poison the communities in which they live and what they do to those who are not part of their low enterprise.

Another aspect that the chroniclers of the Mafia dwell very lightly upon is the intimate connection between them and the various levels of government. It becomes obvious even to persons of limited intelligence very quickly that the Mafia could survive but a short time without the open and conscious relationship with props in the political world. It also appears that every time a searching inquiry is made into the Mafia or Syndicate, it is soon revealed that tendrils and creepers lead toward state governors' mansions and legislatures and also the national Congress; the intimacy with county and local government promptly is demonstrated to be a subject almost too wide in scope to describe in any reasonable length of time or convenient amount of printed paper.

A few hints are loosed as to the billions they amass during wars, the boodle collected in 1941-45 apparently being the capital base for the dramatic expansion of Mafia/Syndicate strength and presence in the

subsequent two decades. But we have no decent study of this incredible event, just tiny references which are made in the nature of asides. Joe Valachi (see note 45) began to describe the small fortune he made evading the economic legislation and controls of the wartime Roosevelt regime, but was diverted to other matters. Other than that direct testimony we have nearly nothing except what can be inferred from the total situation. But a sum of money is involved which must leave most anyone almost breathless, even in the age of marked inflation existing now, nearly a generation later. What are badly needed are economic histories of the Mafia and some companion studies of their interlocked ties with all manner of politicians, and a diminution of the recountings of their homicidal inter-relationships. It is commonplace to note that Mafia are frequently found to be operating businesses which require political certification in the form of licenses and franchises, some of which may be virtually official monopolies.

Luciano boasted of being an important factor in the election of over eighty politicians, from aldermen to senators, in the 1920's alone, as well as claiming the Mafia delivered the New York State delegation at the 1932 Democratic Party presidential convention to Franklin D. Roosevelt, expecting to receive in return the calling off of the investigation into organised crime then going on in New York headed by Judge Samuel Seabury. Apparently underlings promised more than they could deliver, and Luciano declared that from then on the Mafia made no political deliveries prior to a quid pro quo. See Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, Chapters 14-18, inclusive.

[44]Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, pp. 260-262. Luciano went into detail as to his involvement in it from the start, along with Frank Costello and the Anastasia brothers, Albert, a major gunman in Murder, Incorporated, and Anthony ("Tough Tony"), the latter a Mafia power controlling the International Longshoremen's Association. From Luciano's description the actual sabotage was engineered by the latter, with his brother Albert directing the overall strategy to maximise Navy fears of coming widespread destruction all along the New York waterfront. Luciano's explanation of what happened to the *Normandie* makes more sense than the opaque and evasive official excuses and explanations.

[45]On the substantial fortune Joe Valachi amassed just through manipulation of gasoline ration stamps see his brief admissions in Peter Maas, *The Valachi Papers* (New York: Putnam, 1969). Others whom Valachi implicated as becoming wealthy on criminal misuse of ration stamps, alone during World War Two, included Carlo and Paul Gambino, who were estimated to have made well over a million dollars via this route, and the New Jersey gangster Sam Accardi. It was customary to obtain the stamps by theft from Office of Price Administration vaults or by bribing OPA personnel. See also chapter 9 in the symposium *Mafia, U.S.A.*, "Carlo Gambino - Mafia Patriarch," by the editor, Nicholas Gage. In 1944 the national director of the Office of Price Administration, Chester Bowles, admitted that 5% of all gasoline sales was a black market operation, a figure which can be assumed to have been deliberately reduced to allay home front criticism and maximise co-operation with the 'war effort.' Since Valachi was a very minor participant in this aspect of organised crime's fortune-building via mass violation of the various economic restraints under the administration and surveillance of the OPA (among whose employees at one time were the famed economist Milton Friedman and former president Richard M. Nixon), it must be assumed that vastly larger sums were amassed by others. Just how much money was skimmed off during the war by the Mafia will never be known, since the beneficiaries of such operations rarely are known to betray themselves and provide the basic facts, but some estimates have been as high as $30 billion. As Ralph Salerno and John Tompkins put it, "World War II came as a godsend to the Mafia." Salerno and Tompkins, "After Luciano," in Gage, ed., *Mafia, U.S.A.*, p. 100. For an expectable apologia alleging the efficient working of wartime price control, rationing and related apportionment of scarce goods see Marshall B. Clinard, *The Black Market* (New York: Rinehart, 1952).

[46]Smith, *OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1972), p. 105.

[47]Smith apparently knew nothing about organised crime, and identified the "Purple Gang" as from Philadelphia, though this sinister group were from Detroit. According to Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano* (pp.99, 110), the leader of this lot was one Abe Bernstein, and they originally specialised in smuggling quality whiskey across from Canada during Prohibition, purchased mainly from distilleries there headed by Samuel Bronfman and Louis Rosenstiel, later the presidents of Seagram Corporation and Schenley Corporation, respectively. The illegal operations of Bronfman and Rosenstiel and their gang connections are briefly described by Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, pp. 48, 65, 69, 174.

[48]Probably the first identification of Gurfein as a major in the U.S. Military Intelligence was made by Polakoff, a former U.S. Attorney, in the New York *Times*, May 23, 1945, p. 7. For contradictory accounts of the entire complicated business involving the armed forces intelligence organisations, Luciano and various other underworld kingpins see Messick, *Lansky*, pp. 115-122, and Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, 262-272.

[49]Another aspect of the Gurfein-Luciano affair is briefly examined in Anthony Cave Brown, ed., *The Secret War Report of the OSS* (New York: Berkley, Medallion Books, 1976), pp. 191-192, and Smith, *OSS*, p. 84. On Gurfein and the "Pentagon Papers" incident described below, see the footnote to the same page of Smith, *OSS*, above.

[50]Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*,pp. 267, 369-370. One can understand in retrospect why those connected with Governor Dewey could contribute to the legend of "Lucky" Luciano as a decisive factor in the 1943 Sicily invasion, i.e., to provide an excuse for his commuted sentence, but why any officer in the armed forces, any political figure either on the home front or in the Italian occupation, or any other person in mass communication, journalism or independent writing, could contribute to the promotion of this incredible fabrication, remains an imponderable.

[51]New York *Times*, April 24, 1937, p.4. Luciano was so little known in New York that the *Times* spelled his name "Luciana" after police started looking for him in connection with the murder of "Dutch Schultz" (pseud. Arthur Flegenheimer) in Newark, N.J., October 23, 1935. The *Times* got it right the following year, however, when he became front-page news as the Dewey prosecution escalated. It might be pointed out that the police were not too far off in the first place, since Luciano's original name was Salvatore Lucania.

[52]For an extended exposition of the Luciano explanation of his situation as summarised above see Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, Chapters 19 and 20.

[53]Smith, *OSS*, pp. 83-86. Among other criminal elements recruited by the OSS in the Mediterranean theatre were the ferocious underworld of Corsica, principally engaged in the narcotics trade by tradition. But the skills of many Corsican thugs were polished by OSS agents, mainly to aid in the bringing of weapons and ammunition to the preponderantly Stalinist French underground. The Corsican drug suppliers were still in business 30 years later, the main target of their supply now being the heroin addicts in the U.S.A. On this repelling side light of World War Two see the book by the former OSS agent Edward Hymoff, *The OSS in World War II* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1974.)

[54]Davis, *Who Defends Rome?* p. 257.

[55]Davis, *Who Defends Rome?* pp. 257-258. Davis deprecates the entire Sicily operation, insisting that all it did was to return the Mafia to control there even stronger than they had been before their suppression. He thought that a landing on the Italian peninsula north of Rome, or General Dwight D. Eisenhower's plan, an invasion of Corsica and Sardinia, instead of Sicily, would have been somewhat superior tactics. Davis did not identify Russo as a member of the Mafia, but apparently meant that this was to be assumed since he declares that Russo replaced Vizzini as the chief of the Sicilian Mafia scene upon the latter's death, in Palermo, on May 13, 1954 (Vizzini's demise noted in New York *Times*, May 14, 1954, p. 12.) Davis in an earlier book alleged that Vizzini helped to finance Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922 which preceded the taking over of Italy by the Fascisti. His views on the Mafia as an intelligence assistance to the invasion by the 'Allies' in this book do not tally with his reconsiderations in the later one, however. See Davis, *All Rome Trembled: The Strange Affair of Wilma Montesi* (New York: Putnam, 1957), pp. 23-24.

[56]New York: Putnam, 1964, Lewis' book is one of the most quoted works dealing with the alleged influence of Mafia aid in the Sicilian invasion. A portion of this book was published as "The Mafia in Sicily," chapter 3 in Gage, ed., *Mafia, U.S.A.*

[57]Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, chapter 23.

[58]The same thing was done in Germany in 1945, under the impression that all inmates were (1) political prisoners, (2) Jews innocent of ever having done anything, or (3) prisoners of war, not realising, or not being interested in knowing, that sections of these camps housed some of the most dangerous desperadoes in Europe. There was the same simple-minded shock over the sensational rise of murder and other violent crime in the countryside within a 20-mile radius of these camps shortly after.

[59]See especially in this instance the books by Michele Pantaleoni, *The Mafia and Politics*, first published in Italy in 1962, and in an English translation in New York by Coward-McCann in 1966, and *From Caesar to the Mafia* by Luigi Barzini (New York; Library Press, 1971). These writers, though anything but friendly to Mussolini, are understandably perturbed by the breathtaking ignorance and innocence of the 'liberators.' Others have made comical efforts to portray the Mafia as a righteous clan of freedom-lovers, veritable Angel Michaels destroying the many-headed serpent of Fascism. Their release from Mussolini's jails and penal camps is hailed in tones recalling the victories of Garibaldi, Mazzini and Cavour, and righteous lower lips tremble as the British and American authorities covered themselves with clown mantles in describing this lot of systematic murderers as terrorised martyrs. One may imagine the gales of raucous laughter sweeping through all

levels of the "Brotherhood" upon the posting of this preposterous dictum.

Talese in *Honour Thy Father* (p. 60) innocently declares that the Mafia who became mayors of Sicilian communities were former 'intelligence agents', of the Americans and 'underground organisers' against the Fascist and Nazi forces, and were simply "rewarded with lawful authority." He also ascribes profound political beliefs to these *Mafiosi* mayors, who took these jobs not because it was essential to their reconstruction of the pre-1926 status quo but out of pure and zealous 'anti-fascism' and 'hatred of Mussolini.' In these respects they should be bracketed with the Communists, therefore, since these were also their reasons for belonging in the armed opposition. Talese relates that Joe Bonanno and his Mafia friends gloated upon learning of Mussolini's murder by Communists in Milan; in many ways it was as grisly a horror as most of the sensational Mafia murders. Probably they recognised in the Stalinist CPI killers birds of a feather, having resembled a Mafia 'hit' team in the way they took on this assignment.

Puzo in *The Godfather* (p. 328) repeated the story of the release of the Mafia from prison on the grounds that being imprisoned they must be 'democrats.' He calls this the Mafia's "good fortune" and the basic step which preceded their reconstruction and return to even more formidable power than that demonstrated down to 1926.

[60]It might be argued that the Occupation authorities had few choices when it came to replacing the Fascisti in domestic political posts and power. In Sicily the Mafia were by far the overwhelming candidates, once they had been released from jail. In other parts of Italy, later, the Communists were the logical inheritors. Though there had been a towering volume of talk and print about a 'democratic socialist' element which presumably bulked high as an anti-Mussolini adversary, it did not show very strongly in the 1943-45 period of political chaos in Italy. Though America was the home of several very voluble leftist refugees who strove to demonstrate that there was a vast difference between their plans for Italy and those of the Reds, there is little evidence that the Anglo-American occupation decision-makers wanted much to do with them. Such castigators of Mussolini and post-war planners as Salvemini, Sforza and Borghese were not brought back to Italy in triumph and political power, nor were the spiritual associates of Benedetto Croce, another great liberal hero.

[61]One of the most mischievous contributors to Sicily's political woes in the early years after its conquest was an undistinguished English pedagogical meddler, George Robert Gayre. As a minor Occupation bureaucrat there he was one of the first to condemn Mussolini's campaign against the Mafia, though he also was one of the first to admit that within weeks they had returned to influence in Sicily equal in scope to the time prior to 1926. Liberal writers for a quarter of a century echoed his indignation at Mussolini's anti-Mafia procedures, as incorporated in his book *Italy in Transition* (London: Faber and Faber, 1946), a volume made up of quotations from his private diary. As a lieutenant-colonel in the British forces he had authored another contentious work, *Teuton and Slav on the Polish Frontier* (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1944), a pseudo-anthropological study which pretended to be the long-awaited solution to the ancient and tangled ethnic claims in that region. On his return from Sicily to England he devoted himself to several works on English heraldry and ultimately adopted the name "Robert Gayre of Gayre and Nigg."

[62]The situation which prevailed after the Germans moved in, following the eclipse of Mussolini in the summer of 1943, is instructive. The late Bruno Leoni, a post-war free market economist of international repute, told this writer in California in the summer of 1957 that in the summer of 1943 he became an intelligence operative for the 'Allies' but that he periodically sneaked into German-occupied Bari, on Italy's East coast, for the purpose of obtaining an economical dinner. German price controls were rigidly enforced there, while in the areas where he had to function which were in 'Allied' hands a sky-high inflation made such an achievement quite impossible. Only purist zealots who have never been hungry and who do not know that their precious 'laws' are almost entirely suspended in wartime fail to understand the substance of the above action.

[63]The equivalent in areas of France and Belgium occupied by U.S. forces a year later was the comprehensive theft of Army supplies by American deserters for the supply of the black market in these regions. Steven Linakis incorporated material concerning such affairs in his novel *In the Spring the War Ended* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1965).

[64]New York *Times*, September 10, 1943, p. 4.

[65]Editorial, New York *Times*, September 11, 1943, p. 12.

[66]New York *Times*, November 19, 1944, sec. VI, p.50.

[67]New York *Times*, October 31, 1944, p. 8.

[68]New York *Times*, January 5, 1945, p.4.

[69]E.g., New York *Times*, February 1, 1945, p.8.

[70]New York *Times*, November 25, 1944, p. 5.

[71]Frank J. Prial, "Vito Genovese - Power to Spare," in Gage, ed., *Mafia, U.S.A.*, pp. 147-148.

[72]This was Genovese's second trip to Italy in the 1930s. The first had occurred in 1933, a honeymoon vacation to Naples with his wife, Anna. Valachi is the source for an allegation that Genovese on this first voyage took three quarters of a million dollars with him to bribe functionaries of the Mussolini regime. Though there are several who insist that Dewey was about to concentrate on the prosecution of Genovese after Luciano's jailing, there is no mention of Genovese in the New York *Times* for either 1936 or 1937, at which time press coverage of the Dewey crime hunt was voluminous.

Luciano is the source for the assertion of a trip back to Italy of another Neapolitan gangster, Johnny Torrio, identified as the "man behind" Al Capone in Chicago, who did not find things very salubrious there, and returned to the U.S.A., apparently in 1926, the year Mussolini's campaign against the Mafia began. Things got increasingly hot for Torrio after Capone was convicted of income tax evasion for the years 1924-1929; he was arrested in White Plains, N.Y. on the charge of evading U.S. liquor taxes on April 22, 1936 (his wife paid his $104,000 bail in cash). He was indicted for income tax evasion on September 4, 1937 and convicted on April 11, 1939. Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, pp. 87-88; New York *Times*, June 20, 1931, p. 16; October 18, 1931, p. 1; April 23, 1936, p. 1; September 4, 1937, p. 1; April 13, 1939, p. 48.

[73]The story of the lesser hoodlums Ernest Rupolo and Willie Gallo and their involvement in Boccia's slaying at the behest of Genovese and Michele Miranda has been told many times. See among others Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, pp. 177-178, 274; James Mills, "The Hit" in Gage, ed., *Mafia, U.S.A.*, pp. 25-55, and Prial, "Vito Genovese," *same work*, pp. 147-148.

[74]Early in 1944 Army Criminal Investigation operatives began picking up black marketeers in Italy who named Genovese as the mastermind of their operations. Genovese came under the personal scrutiny of Sergeant Orange C. Dickey of the Army CID, who gradually put together the material which revealed the true scope of his multi-million dollar ring based on the theft of products from the base at which he worked as an advisor and interpreter. It is quite likely that the Army would have dropped the charges against Genovese had not Sgt. Dickey learned that the Boccia case had been reopened as a result of the new testimony of Rupolo and that the Brooklyn authorities were again looking for Genovese. See Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, pp. 273-274, and Prial, source and pages, *above*.

[75]See the embarrassing testimonials to Genovese's sterling qualities by his superiors, Captain Charles L. Dunn, Major E.N. Holmgren, and Major Stephen Young, reproduced in Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, p. 273.

[76]New York *Times*, June 3, 1945, p. 26.

[77]Genovese's trial was delayed in about the same way as his extradition. New York *Times*, October 19, 1945, p. 19. This story retold his exploits as an interpreter for American Military Government and "boss of a gang of Italian black market operators."

[78]Gallo and Rupolo testified in the trial on June 7. The death of the crucial witness Peter La Tempa in jail, where he had been held in protective custody, destroyed the case against Genovese. Luciano maintained that Mafia elements succeeded in penetrating the jail and adding poison to a medicine La Tempa was taking for an ailment. When Genovese was indicted his close fellow Mafia associate Michele Miranda, who had also fled to Italy, was named in the document. Proceedings to have him extradited began but he did not get back to the United States until September, 1946, well after the trial of Genovese had ended. He pleaded not guilty (the *Times* persisted in spelling his name "Mirandi") and was soon released. Luciano says that Miranda was among the big Mafia chiefs who greeted him when he made his short-lived appearance in Havana the following year. Rupolo was again sentenced to jail for another shooting, that of Carl Sparacino, on a 5-10 year hitch, but was freed from jail on September 23, 1949. His sentence had originally been suspended in July, 1946 at the request of Assistant District Attorney Julius Helfand for his co-operation in the reopening of the Genovese case. Rupolo was later murdered and his body found floating in the surf of a Queens County beach. New York *Times*, May 7, 1946, p. 11; June 8, 1946, p. 38; June 11, 1946, p. 46; July 16, 1946, p. 15; September 17, 1946, p. 2; see also sources cited in note 73.

[79]One of the most wearily-repeated yarns among Mafia chroniclers is the allegation concerning Genovese following his return to Italy in 1937 to evade prosecution for various major crimes committed in the U.S.A. How he obtained a passport so easily and so quickly under these pending circumstances is unexplained by anyone, and is not mentioned in a single source consulted in the preparation of this study. The federal government did try to deport him in 1952, however, for concealing his criminal record when he applied for citizenship in 1936. (New York *Times*, November 22, 1952, p. 12.) The assertions of Luciano and Valachi and the second hand testimony of a wronged wife appear to be the main evidence that he became a man of substance in Mussolini's Italy and an intimate with persons high in the regime. (On Anna Genovese's suit, first for separate maintenance, then

divorce, her testimony before a New Jersey grand jury, Vito Genovese's counter-divorce suit and the dismissal of both by the court, see New York *Times*, December 10, 1952, p. 55; March 3, 1953, p. 19; March 20, 1953, p. 20; August 20, 1953, p. 29.) No one alleges that he created a criminal empire there in the six years prior to the overthrow of Mussolini and the entry upon the scene of the Anglo-American 'liberators' in 1943. What is evident however is that within a few months of the latter event he organised an impressive ring of professional criminality in Italy in some areas occupied by Mussolini's conquerors, at the same time penetrating the latter to the point of becoming a part of the Military Government. This is a disconcerting fact, and all accounts of the Mafia cover this over quickly and heavily, concentrating on a narrative of his pursuit by Army CID. But nothing is said about *how* a man as notorious as Genovese was able to achieve this status and at the same time conceal his incredible crime operation, which he managed simultaneously in the same area where he performed his chores for Military Government. Though his alleged eminence in the Mussolini social court is subject to serious question (nothing is said of it in contemporary accounts), his taking on of a cover job in American Military Government to mask a lucrative criminal operation in the American-occupied sector of Italy is well documented. The reason for the glacial slowness with which extradition proceedings back to the U.S.A. were transacted is another episode in the Genovese saga which is almost entirely lacking from the conventional accounts. The attempt to build up Genovese as someone of influence among the Fascisti has a hollow sound. But if it were true, then allowing him to obtain a confidential post in the Military Government so quickly would indicate a level of serious incompetence in 'Allied' counter-intelligence.

[80]Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*, p. 275.

[81]New York *Times*, May 23, 1945, p. 7.

[82]New York *Times*, January 4, 1946, p. 38.

[83]New York *Times*, February 9, 1946, p. 15; February 10, 1946, p. 12; February 11, 1946, p. 31; February 21, 1946, p. 24.

[84]New York *Times*, March 1, 1946, p. 11, Luciano's own colourful story of the trip back to Italy and his reception is in chapter 24 of Gosch and Hammer, *Lucky Luciano*.

[85]On Lt. Col. Gurfein's later comments on Luciano's involvement in contacting Mafia leaders for help in counter-espionage during the war see New York *Times*, February 23, 1947, pp. 1, 9.

[86]Haffenden's later comment on Luciano's assistance in New York *Times*, February 27, 1947, p. 46.

[87]Haffenden was dismissed by O'Dwyer on May 24, 1946; see New York *Times*, May 25, 1946, p. 30; May 26, 1946, p. 30.

[88]Sen. Kefauver's comment on Gov. Dewey's handling of the Luciano case in New York *Times*, May 15, 1951, p. 27. See also one of the contemporary books on the Mafia, Edward Reid's *Mafia* (New York: Random House, 1952.)

[89]New York *Times*, January 31, 1946, p. 2; February 5, 1946, p. 7.

[90]See especially New York *Times*, October 27, 1946, p. 23; October 31, 1946, p. 2.

[91]This event was largely missed when it happened, but was expanded upon by Giuliani three weeks before he was killed; see New York *Times*, June 13, 1950, p. 12.

[92]New York *Times*, September 21, 1946, p.4.

[93]On Giuliani's anti-Communist manifesto see New York *Times*, June 24, 1947, p. 14; Montelegripe raid reported in New York *Times*, September 22, 1947, p. 3.

[94]New York *Times*, June 25, 1947, p. 16.

[95]New York *Times*, June 26, 1947, p. 4.

[96]New York *Times*, June 28, 1947, p. 4.

[97]New York *Times*, November 22, 1947, p. 2.

[98]New York *Times*, September 24, 1948, p.8.

[99]New York *Times*, May 16, 1949, p. 11.

[100]New York *Times*, July 6, 1950, p. 1.

[101]On the repercussions of the Giuliani killing and the build-up of the scandal see New York *Times*, March 19, 1954, p. 2. Davis, *All Rome Trembled*, pp.137-139.

[102]New York *Times*, May 14, 1954, p.5.

[103]The closing chapters of Davis, *All Rome Trembled*, contain the most extended examination of the ramifications of the Montesi matter; his study unfortunately lacks an index, and one must wade through much extraneous material in getting at the core of the issue involved.

[104]On the persistence of the Mafia in Sicily in recent times, see Danilo Dolci, *The Man Who Plays Alone* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), and Gaia Servadio, *Mafioso: A History of the Mafia from Its Origins to the Present Day* (New York: Stein and Day, 1976).

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From the Olde Scrap(s) Book.

Nothing has changed. We are not leaving Lebanon. The marines are being deployed two or three miles to the west.

CASPAR WEINBERGER, US Defense Secretary, denying in 1984 that the movement of US troops amounted to a retreat. The deployment 'two or three miles to the west' just happened to be from land bases on Lebanese soil to ships offshore.

BOOK REVIEW

Fascinating Questions and Answers About Money Power

THE BABYLONIAN WOE

By Capt. DAVID ASTLE

"What is money? How did it get started? Who trusts it? Who has the right to print it or mint it? Is money here to stay and if not what will take its place? Has there ever been , or will there ever be, equality in the possession of money or other assets?

David Astle has given a good part of his life in a study of these questions and now puts the benefit of years or reading and research into this book which is part history; part criticism and part prophecy. To get back to the first question. What really IS money? Some intelligent and surprising answers are here." Gordon Sinclair.

Some years ago I had the pleasure of meeting Captain Astle when he was a guest of Miss. Rosine de Bounevialle at Forest House. His knowledge of the money system is breathtaking but only very recently have I received and read a copy of his masterwork *The Babylonian Woe*. I recommend it very highly. *CT.*

* * * *

(The following review by Stanley Burton-Thomson of *The Babylonian Woe* appeared originally in the September 27, 1993 issue of the Washington newspaper *The Spotlight*)

Sometimes in life we encounter a book that completely alters our whole perspective, and therefore cannot be reviewed in the usual manner. By its message, so peculiar to today, *The Babylonian Woe* by Capt. David Astle, is such a one.

From the first time of reading, and I have read it eleven times, I have been a changed man. No book has ever shown more clearly that "it has all happened before"; that the force thrusting toward the New World Order, "one world" in the dreams of its designers, is the same as that force which thrust up those civilisations in the past, whereof is written record, and finally was their destroyer.

Astle in this amazing work, shows that a secret and private international force never ceased its endeavours to misappropriate the money creative power of the sovereign states which necessarily is the will of their ruler. Astle takes the reader from the Solutrean deposits of northern France, and the mammoth hunters, by winding paths through Ur, Uruk, Kish, Lagash and Babylon, and other cities of the very ancient world, to today; his message never lost.

FASCINATING THEME

Once you begin *The Babylonian Woe*, you will find it hard to put down. You will be attracted again and again to its fascinating theme, its scholarly research and disciplined presentation. Astle is fully in control of his subject and pulls no punches.

My review cannot do justice to the majesty and magnificence of this work. Unlike many other books on the subject of money power, *The Babylonian Woe* does not withhold its criticism of both Establishment and weak rulers. As you read chapter XIII, you will surely become angry at how rulers, wittingly or unwittingly, were led to betray their trust, even to betraying their men at arms in battle (and letting them be sold on the block as slaves).

This important book is an indictment of the venality of "bankers", their crime of indiscriminate "abstract" money creation, a highly organised system of legally tolerated counterfeit, has wrecked the states for thousands of years.

Law No.7 of Hammuabadi ordered death for anyone found guilty of this form of theft. (A parallel exists in Manu IX, 292: "The most pernicious of all deceivers is a goldsmith who commits frauds. The maharajah shall order him to be cut to pieces with razors.")

The Babylonian Woe leaves no doubt that state debt is invalid. So necessarily are taxes to repay it. It educates in the essential truth in money; what money is, and what it is not. It is a book that is sure to shock. It awakens nations to the real danger that monetary creation and emission is not controlled by the will of visible rulers, as most believe; it is in the hands of private supranational persons, not accountable to any sobering state.

DESTRUCTION DANGER

Through mischief they slyly instigate, they may destroy everything and everyone in their insane thrust toward world government – by themselves.

Following the establishment of the Bank of England, AD 1694, international money power, in its new designation, feverishly sold the idea of banking and its central banks, world-wide; using the British empire as enforcer when expedient. E.g., the Boxer affair instigated to force the Chinese empress to accept their loans of pen created money.

Central banks were (and are. *C.T.*) portrayed as state institutions, though in actuality privately and secretly owned: the Deutschbank, the Bank of France, the Reserve Bank of India, founded under the unsuspecting nose of the raj...Finally the United States was tricked into the Federal Reserve Bank.

While the blood of our best men flowed down the beaches of Normandy, and hopes and hearts were with them, at Bretton Woods, secretly gathering the harvest of war, July 1, 1944, their International Monetary Fund (IMF) was established; instrument of the World Bank and its fearful master, the UN. Trained clerks now dictate policy to the struggling states.

As a reviewer in the University of Toronto said, "Perhaps Astle by chance has hit the truth."

Read and study Astle's book and you too will know the truth.

* * * *

Hardback. Paper jacket. Illustrated. 250pp.
To order please send $35 US if in USA/Canada. $40 if outside or £25 cash in a small padded envelope to
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Printed and published by the A.K. Chesterton Trust, BCM CANDOUR, London, WC1N 3XX
(Editor: Colin Todd)

Candour Extra

Why ***Mussolini and the Mafia?*** My answer to this is because it is an article that does not date. (My poor health has been a problem). Indeed, the more that I think about the article the more it resounds with the present situation in Afghanistan, Iraq. With Syria & Iran next. 'Tony' " the Cheshire Cat" and 'Liberation'. Suitably catastrophic bedfellows indeed.

NEW BOOK: ***MUSSOLINI***. A New Life by Nicholas Farrell. ISBN 0 297 81965 8. An excellent reappraisal of Il Duce! "We live in post-Communist times and there are signs that we are moving into post-democratic times as well. So perhaps the point has been reached at which it is possible to try to set the record straight". Farrell presents an excellent case. £25.00 but well worth the money when you consider how much is charged for the official lies about Churchill, et al; Superb photos. 533 pages. As you will note I have given you the ISBN number so that you can order it from your local library.

FOREVER FLYING THE FLAG!

We are going to set up a flagpole at Miss. Rosine de Bounevialle's graveside at her beloved Forest House. The Cross of St. George shall always fly with her. £195.00 + VAT. It is made of fibreglass and will be bolted to a concrete base with a steel fitting. It will be 5m tall. (15ft. to us).

ALL donations should be made to the **A.K. Chesterton Trust** and sent to **BCM CANDOUR,** London, WC1N 3XX.

RENEWALS

Subscriptions run for 12 consecutive issues (one Volume).

Please do not take offence if I have included a renewal form with this issue when you are not due to do any such thing. Rosine had her own unique filing system which would defeat all but the best cryptologist. It is being updated but I need your help and patience. Many of you have made very generous donations in the past which I also take into consideration. If YOU know when your sub is due please let me know.

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